Power analysis of the Nice Treaty on the future of European integration

Yener Kandogan

Applied Economics, 2005, vol. 37, issue 10, 1147-1156

Abstract: Power analysis of changes in voting weights and rules in the Nice Treaty is done by applying methods that use Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf indices. Significant decreases in voting power of small countries make widening of integration more acceptable to incumbent members due to small size of the applicants. Relative increases in the conciliatory power of smaller members, and relative increases in the independent power of bigger members make smaller members compromise more, and improve the position of large members for further deepening of the integration. Lastly, the fairness analysis reveals a more federalist EU in the way votes are distributed.

Date: 2005
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DOI: 10.1080/00036840500109498

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