Towards an equilibrium level of market reform: how politics affects the dynamics of policy change

Leone Leonida, Dario Maimone Ansaldo Patti and Pietro Navarra

Applied Economics, 2007, vol. 39, issue 13, 1627-1634

Abstract: In this article we examine the dynamics of economic reforms that are implemented by incumbent policy-makers interested in maintaining their political power. We use a sample of 86 countries over a time period going from 1980 to 2001 and find that the achievement of an equilibrium level of market liberalization is highly costly. Our results are robust to endogenity and model specification.

Date: 2007
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DOI: 10.1080/00036840600690231

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