Open vs. sealed-bid auctions: testing for revenue equivalence under Singapore's vehicle quota system

Winston Koh, Roberto Mariano and Y. K. Tse ()

Applied Economics, 2007, vol. 39, issue 1, 125-134

Abstract: Using data from the auction of vehicle quota licenses in Singapore, we study if revenue equivalence holds when the auction format was switched from a sealed-bid format (May 1990 to June 2001) to an open bidding format since July 2001. Our econometric analysis indicates the change in auction format led to a change in bidding behavior. On average, the quota license premium under the open bidding format is about US$1000 (about 7.5% of the Category E license price in June 2001) lower, compared to the forecast level that would have prevailed if there had been no change in the auction format.

Date: 2007
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DOI: 10.1080/00036840500427916

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