Ownership of property-rights and the allocation of talents

Haoming Liu and Yohanes Riyanto

Applied Economics, 2009, vol. 41, issue 26, 3425-3436

Abstract: Under the reserve-clause system that assigns the property-rights on the Major League Baseball players' services to teams, player transfers are negotiated between teams without the involvement of players. In contrast, under the current free-agency system, players with free-agent status negotiate directly with potential suitors. Thus, the system assigns the property-rights to players. Using data extracted from the Baseball Archive (http://baseball1.com), this article examines the effect of the change in the property-rights assignment on the allocation of talents across teams. We find that the change increased large-market teams' shares of veteran all-star players and the concentration of senior players.

Date: 2009
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00036840701392869 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:applec:v:41:y:2009:i:26:p:3425-3436

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/RAEC20

DOI: 10.1080/00036840701392869

Access Statistics for this article

Applied Economics is currently edited by Anita Phillips

More articles in Applied Economics from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().