Is the use of bank debt as a governance mechanism conditioned by the financial system? The cases of Chile and Spain

Paolo Saona and Eleuterio Vallelado

Applied Economics, 2010, vol. 42, issue 13, 1709-1726

Abstract: We test whether the use of bank debt as a governance mechanism is conditioned by the financial system in which firms operate. Our results indicate that the legal and institutional environment determines the use of bank debt to finance growth opportunities. Firms use bank debt to finance their growth opportunities when the country's banking system contributes to solving agency and asymmetric information problems and avoiding information monopoly costs. The evolutionary process of the financial systems in each country means that market imperfections such as information asymmetry or agency costs can have a diverse influence on firms' bank debt decisions.

Date: 2010
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DOI: 10.1080/00036840701736065

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