Options using a collective lottery to ration vaccines during an influenza pandemic

Sheng-Tung Chen, Chih-Ching Yang, Wei-Chun Tseng and Chi-Chung Chen
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Sheng Tung Chen ()

Applied Economics, 2010, vol. 42, issue 8, 1055-1065

Abstract: For many countries, the best way to counter an influenza pandemic is to provide citizens with a pandemic vaccine. However, since the global supply of the vaccines is far smaller than the quantity demanded, how to allocate the limited vaccines can be a very challenging task for them. In this study, we introduce a collective lottery mechanism that allocates vaccines as fairly as the traditional lottery, while also offering more options for family members or those who are close so that they can choose the joint probability of successes that can maximize their welfare. This mechanism thus gives rise to a Pareto improvement over the traditional lottery. Our empirical study uses the US and the UK as examples in sequential collective lotteries that are simulated to prove that such an improvement while maintaining fairness, in fact, exists.

Date: 2010
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DOI: 10.1080/00036840701721091

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