International trade and the incentive for merger

Martin Chalkley and Geoff Stewart

Applied Economics, 2011, vol. 43, issue 13, 1673-1677

Abstract: This article examines the profitability of horizontal merger in an open economy with Cournot competition. We find that duopoly is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for domestic merger to be profitable. A cross-border merger, however, can be profitable from any market structure.

Date: 2011
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Working Paper: International Trade and the Incentive for Merger (2004)
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DOI: 10.1080/00036840903527171

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