Property tax shifting under imperfect competition

Mustafa Oktem and Ju-Chin Huang

Applied Economics, 2011, vol. 43, issue 2, 139-152

Abstract: The hedonic price models are commonly used to empirically assess the degree to which property taxes are shifted from property owners to property renters. The findings of these studies vary sporadically in terms of the degree of tax shifting. The competitiveness of housing markets may significantly influence the degree of tax shifting. In this article, we allow a nonzero price-cost markup in the hedonic price equation and examine the impact of market power on property tax shifting. In our case study, we examine the property-specific characteristics, occupancy record and local property tax associated with hundreds of managed rental properties in central New Hampshire. The results show that, depending on the degree of market power exercised by a property management firm, the anti-competitive structure of the market may significantly contribute to property tax shifting from property owners to property renters.

Date: 2011
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00036840802446614 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:applec:v:43:y:2011:i:2:p:139-152

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/RAEC20

DOI: 10.1080/00036840802446614

Access Statistics for this article

Applied Economics is currently edited by Anita Phillips

More articles in Applied Economics from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().