Reciprocal deposits and incremental bank risk

Sherrill Shaffer

Applied Economics, 2013, vol. 45, issue 34, 4857-4860

Abstract: Even after controlling for other observable factors, reciprocal deposits are associated with higher bank risk as measured by the probability of failure and the Z -score. These results are consistent with the moral hazard hypothesis and reject the risk substitution hypothesis.

Date: 2013
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Working Paper: Reciprocal Deposits and Incremental Bank Risk (2012)
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DOI: 10.1080/00036846.2013.806784

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