Market structure and casino taxation in tourist resorts

Xinhua Gu and Pui Sun Tam

Applied Economics, 2014, vol. 46, issue 10, 1049-1057

Abstract: This article examines the association of tax effects with market structure for casino gaming. We show that if market structure is uncompetitive, much of casino taxation falls on tourists whose demand is inelastic relative to supply. The tax is likely to be efficient under strong external demand if imposed on oligopoly casinos with a monopoly location in a cross-border market. The likelihood of economically 'good' taxation is greater under oligopoly than under competition but lower than under monopoly. Casino taxes should be lowered in a more competitive market with weaker external demand. Our prediction is consistent with the evidence found from casino tourism development in Macao with 'high' gambling taxes.

Date: 2014
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DOI: 10.1080/00036846.2013.864037

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