Whistleblower laws and exposed corruption in the United States

Rajeev Goel and Michael Nelson

Applied Economics, 2014, vol. 46, issue 20, 2331-2341

Abstract: This research creates a unique internet-based measure of awareness about state-level whistleblower laws and provisions to examine their effects on observed corruption in the United States. Are whistleblower laws complementary or substitutes for other, more direct, corruption control measures? Placing the analysis within the corruption literature, the findings show that greater whistleblower awareness results in more observed corruption and this finding holds across specifications. Internet awareness about whistleblower laws seems relatively more effective at exposing corruption than the quantity and quality of state whistleblower laws themselves.

Date: 2014
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Working Paper: Effectiveness of whistleblower laws in combating corruption (2013)
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DOI: 10.1080/00036846.2014.894633

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