Insider ownership and financial flexibility

Naiwei Chen and E-N Hsiao

Applied Economics, 2014, vol. 46, issue 29, 3609-3629

Abstract: This study examines the cash flow sensitivity of external financing (financial flexibility (FF)) of firms from the perspective of the agency by focusing on whether and how insider ownership has a modifying effect on the FF of firms. Given the documented relationship between corporate governance and cost of external financing, insider ownership, an important proxy of corporate governance, should affect FF via the agency cost channel. A review of the US nonfinancial firms from 1992 to 2009 indicates that insider ownership aids in determining the FF of firms. More specifically, results indicate the existence of optimal insider ownership, and any deviation from it causes FF to decrease. In addition, FF is higher when CEO ownership is lower (>0.08%) and this phenomenon is more pronounced for financially unconstrained firms. Furthermore, FF is higher when non-CEO insider ownership is in the middle range (0.12--0.43%) for financially constrained firms, whereas non-CEO insider ownership has minimal impact on FF for unconstrained firms.

Date: 2014
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DOI: 10.1080/00036846.2014.937035

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