Demand disruption and coordination of supply chain via effort and revenue sharing

Yanyan Zheng, Shu Tong, Shouyang Wang, Shou Chen, Lai and Lu Gan

Applied Economics, 2015, vol. 47, issue 54, 5886-5901

Abstract: This article explores the equilibrium behaviour of a basic supplier-retailer distribution channel under demand disruption via effort and revenue sharing contract. This differs from the traditional supply chain coordination model. Firstly, demand is simultaneously affected by retail price and nonprice marketing effort from manufacturers and retailers. Secondly, when the demand is disrupted, this article considers disruptions in the market scale and price sensitivity coefficient. Thirdly, the supply chain coordination model is proposed via effort and revenue sharing contract. In this way, the manufacturer reduces the wholesale price as an incentive for the retailer to share revenue. Finally, the total supply chain profit is greater with contract than no contract. This also constitutes another incentive for the players to follow the effort and revenue sharing contract.

Date: 2015
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DOI: 10.1080/00036846.2015.1058914

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