Can a corrupt ruling party win a re-election through vote buying?

Stephen Devadoss and Jeff Luckstead

Applied Economics, 2016, vol. 48, issue 1, 18-23

Abstract: In many developing countries, it is common for electoral candidates to use embezzled money to buy votes. We develop a dynamic model to analyse the trade-off between economic performance and free handouts resulting from corruption on an incumbent party's chances of being re-elected. The results show, because voters anticipate handouts from the politicians, politicians engage in corrupt behaviour early in the election cycle while minimizing unemployment and maximizing vote buying at the end of the election cycle.

Date: 2016
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DOI: 10.1080/00036846.2015.1073839

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