Renegotiation on incomplete procurement contracts

Hojin Jung

Applied Economics, 2016, vol. 48, issue 23, 2125-2138

Abstract: This article examines the impact of incomplete contracts on procurement costs in road construction auctions. Ex ante contracts in these auctions often fail to specify all of the potential construction contingencies, and consequently, changes in scope are necessary after construction begins. Using Vermont road construction contract data, this study finds evidence that there is a statistically significant difference in costs of firms between auctions with and without extra work adjustments. Substantial adaptation costs are responsible for the higher procurement outlays in incomplete contract. I also find that bidders inflate their bids to incorporate risk premiums in incomplete contracts; however, my estimates suggest that this bidding behaviour does not affect their profit margins.

Date: 2016
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DOI: 10.1080/00036846.2015.1114579

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