Reverse takeover: the moderating role of family ownership

Isabel Feito-Ruiz, Clara Cardone-Riportella and Susana Menéndez-Requejo

Applied Economics, 2016, vol. 48, issue 42, 4051-4065

Abstract: The aim of this study was to analyse the determinants of reverse takeovers, examining the influence of target firm shareholders’ type in the agreement. We examine reverse takeovers implemented in the Alternative Investment Market between 1999 and 2012, paying special attention to the differences between family and non-family target firms, as well as the impact of the financial crisis.We propose that family firms have a lower probability of accepting a reverse takeover (‘shell’ firm), to avoid both diluting the ownership structure (loss of control) and new shareholders entering their firm. Our main findings show that the higher the percentage of ownership held by family holders, the lower the probability of their being the target firm in a reverse takeover. This effect is maintained during the crisis period, in accordance with the expectation that family firms will have fewer financial constraints.

Date: 2016
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DOI: 10.1080/00036846.2016.1150952

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