Non-elective C-sections in public hospitals: capacity constraints and doctor incentives

Alejandro Arrieta and Ariadna García Prado

Applied Economics, 2016, vol. 48, issue 49, 4719-4731

Abstract: Using administrative records of births from the Perinatal Surveillance System of the Peruvian Social Security System (ESSALUD), we test whether high admissions of pregnant women affected non-elective caesarean section (C-section) rates in the ESSALUD public hospitals during 2005–2006. We present a basic theoretical model that considers physician preferences for leisure and hospital capacity constraints, and test the model predictions. We find that physician demand for leisure increases the probability of C-sections in small and medium-size hospitals, while hospital capacity constraints set a limit on them. We discuss the policy implications as well as the policies implemented to avoid unnecessary C-sections.

Date: 2016
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DOI: 10.1080/00036846.2016.1164820

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