Fighting as a profit maximizing strategy in the National Hockey League: more evidence

Duane Rockerbie

Applied Economics, 2016, vol. 48, issue 4, 292-299

Abstract: This article estimates the effect of fighting in hockey games on attendance in the National Hockey League (NHL) over the 1997-1998 through 2009-2010 seasons. After estimating a system of equations developed from a model of a profit-maximizing club owner, it was found that fighting had a small negative effect on attendance implying that encouraging fighting on the ice is not a profit-maximizing strategy. The results are quite robust when incorporating capacity constraints on attendance and exogenous ticket pricing. Other factors that determine club performance and market size were found to significantly affect attendance. The empirical results also suggest that NHL club owners are maximizing profit.

Date: 2016
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DOI: 10.1080/00036846.2015.1078446

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