Excluded coalitions and the distribution of power in parliaments

Tobias Hiller

Applied Economics, 2016, vol. 48, issue 4, 321-330

Abstract: In this article, we introduce a new value for cooperative games. This value is based on the Shapley (1953) value and takes into account that players exclude coalitions with other players. One example of such exclusions are the coalition statements of parliamentary parties. A case study demonstrates the application of the new value for these situations.

Date: 2016
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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DOI: 10.1080/00036846.2015.1078449

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