Does garbage pricing increase the immoral disposal of household waste?

Takehiro Usui (), Mitsuko Chikasada and Kazuhiko Kakamu

Applied Economics, 2017, vol. 49, issue 38, 3829-3840

Abstract: Some empirical studies have attempted to clarify the mechanism of illegal dumping by examining the degree to which per-bag pricing plays a role. However, previous research on the behaviour of avoiding paying a charge for waste collection has tended to neglect so-called ‘immoral disposal,’ which is less risky than illegal dumping because there is no legal penalty. In this study, we define immoral disposal as the dumping of waste in a manner that is immoral but not illegal. To detect the existence of immoral disposal, we apply a spatial econometric approach, namely an extended panel spatial Durbin model, to identify the actual spillover effect of garbage pricing in neighbouring municipalities on immoral disposal from the total waste. A major finding of this study is that immoral disposal exists in unit-based pricing, two-tiered pricing, and fixed pricing.

Date: 2017
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DOI: 10.1080/00036846.2016.1270414

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