Directors network centrality and earnings quality

Bright Gershion Godigbe, Chin Man Chui and Chih-Liang Liu

Applied Economics, 2018, vol. 50, issue 50, 5381-5400

Abstract: This study examines whether firms with network central boards of directors behave differently from other firms in terms of financial reporting quality. We find that earnings quality among firms is low when board networks are channels of incorrect information transmission (including earnings management information) and for firms whose directors are awarded equity-based compensation have connections through boardroom networks, but earnings quality is better for firms with good performance in spite of their networks. These results are robust to controlling for firm information environment, growth, size, age, leverage, performance, volatility in firm operations, and corporate governance.

Date: 2018
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/00036846.2018.1486992 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:applec:v:50:y:2018:i:50:p:5381-5400

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/RAEC20

DOI: 10.1080/00036846.2018.1486992

Access Statistics for this article

Applied Economics is currently edited by Anita Phillips

More articles in Applied Economics from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().