Regulation and investment in the U.S. telecommunications industry

George Ford

Applied Economics, 2018, vol. 50, issue 56, 6073-6084

Abstract: Reversing a two-decade deregulatory trend of telecommunications services, in 2010 U.S. regulators embarked on an aggressive regulatory agenda including, but not limited to, the regulation of high-speed Internet services under the auspices of net neutrality using utility-style regulations codified in the 1930s. Firms, regulators, and analysts feared a reduction in capital spending, contradicting established policy goals of expanding Internet availability and adoption. In this article, a difference-in-differences regression model augmented with randomization inference is applied to government data on capital spending in telecommunications. Large negative effects on investment are found. The estimated effects are robust across changes in estimation periods and model specifications, and multiple tests of the model’s assumptions lend credibility to the findings.

Date: 2018
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DOI: 10.1080/00036846.2018.1489115

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