The United States’ higher education antitrust exemption and college enrollment

John Karikari and Hashem Dezhbakhsh

Applied Economics, 2019, vol. 51, issue 10, 1069-1080

Abstract: This study examines the effect of the higher education antitrust exemption on enrollment of financial aid applicants at highly selective private colleges. The antitrust exemption, used since 2002, was extended to 2022 by the U.S. Congress in 2015, allowing colleges with need-blind admission policy to use common standards without discussing or comparing individual awards. Our findings, which are contrary to earlier studies, suggest that the likelihood of enrollment at the colleges implementing the antitrust exemption increased compared to those that did not. Concerns about the adverse effect of the exemption on enrollment, therefore, seems to be unwarranted. Moreover, the common standards used by need-blind colleges do not seem to increase college access for low income students. These findings can be useful to policy makers who soon have to consider extending the exception beyond 2022.

Date: 2019
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DOI: 10.1080/00036846.2018.1524978

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