Do voluntary corporate activities lead to reporting regulation? evidence from corporate social responsibility

George Deltas () and Hui Wen

Applied Economics, 2022, vol. 54, issue 56, 6510-6520

Abstract: Governments and regulators often introduce reporting standards to encourage desirable corporate activities through increasing information quality. Firms that voluntarily take socially desirable activities directly benefit from these standards by being better able to distinguish them against rivals in the product market or with respect to investors. Using a cross-country panel dataset, we find that, at an annual frequency, Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) reports increase the prevalence of voluntary CSR reporting standards, but little evidence that the converse is true. Thus, at least in the short-run, reporting standards act as an ex-post certification for firms with high CSR activity rather than as an ex-ante incentive for corporate behaviour.

Date: 2022
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/00036846.2022.2070594 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:applec:v:54:y:2022:i:56:p:6510-6520

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/RAEC20

DOI: 10.1080/00036846.2022.2070594

Access Statistics for this article

Applied Economics is currently edited by Anita Phillips

More articles in Applied Economics from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().