Duration of fixed exchange rate regimes: the role of central bank independence

Mahama Samir Bandaogo and Emmanuel K.K. Lartey

Applied Economics, 2024, vol. 56, issue 17, 2025-2038

Abstract: Using a comprehensive dataset, this paper estimates a hazard model to examine whether central bank independence matters for the sustainability of fixed exchange rate regimes. The findings suggest that fixed exchange rate regimes are more likely to have a longer duration under more independent central banks; a result that holds true whether an exit from such a regime is orderly or disorderly. Thus, a more independent central bank is more likely to facilitate a more durable fixed exchange rate regime.

Date: 2024
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DOI: 10.1080/00036846.2023.2178630

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