Asymmetric information, signaling, and round listing prices: evidence from China’s housing market

Limin Liang, Hongfei Li and Chengjiu Sun

Applied Economics, 2024, vol. 56, issue 44, 5289-5301

Abstract: This paper argues that in housing transaction with asymmetric information, sellers may signal their private information with special design of listing prices. We build a cheap-talk signalling model in which sellers strategically choose round number listing prices to signal their weakness, i.e. they are willing to accept lower prices in order to sell their houses more quickly. Using housing market transaction data in Beijing, we find that round number listings sell 0.13% lower and 0.086 months sooner than precise ones. We also show that these results are unlikely to be driven by housing unobserved attributes or round number self-attractiveness. In addition, we find that as the roundness of listing price increases, the signalling effects become more pronounced. Our results present empirical evidence that signalling helps improve negotiation efficiency under asymmetric information.

Date: 2024
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DOI: 10.1080/00036846.2023.2244252

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