Calcutta auctions

Matt E. Ryan and Dan Smolsky

Applied Economics, 2024, vol. 56, issue 44, 5318-5327

Abstract: This analysis is the first study to examine an emergent wagering market: the Calcutta auction. Participants in Calcutta auctions bid for entrants that compete to earn a pre-determined percentage of an unknown total pot size. Utilizing 13-year data from an in-person Calcutta auction of NCAA men’s basketball tournament teams, evidence exists of a traditional favourite-longshot bias, of lower overall returns existing for teams in the middle of the team quality distribution and of auction participants being unable to correctly identify (through higher bids) teams that ultimately win more games after their quality is taken into account.

Date: 2024
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DOI: 10.1080/00036846.2023.2244254

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