CEO’s personal legal liability and earnings management

Yahao Dong, Xiaomei Wang and Bofu Deng

Applied Economics, 2024, vol. 56, issue 51, 6314-6332

Abstract: This paper examines the incentive effect of the personal legal liability for a CEO. Exploiting a unique Chinese law that a legal representative of a firm bears personal legal liability for a firm’s illegal activities, we document a decrease in earnings management when the CEO is also the firm’s legal representative. Additional analysis shows that the impact of a CEO’s legal liability on earnings management is more salient when the CEO is externally recruited, lacks family background, and when the firm faces enormous litigation risk. The findings are robust to endogeneity and after accounting for the CEO’s characteristics. Our study contributes to managerial legal liability, law and finance, and financial reporting research.

Date: 2024
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DOI: 10.1080/00036846.2023.2273237

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