The role of political party in firm environmental governance: evidence from China

Xinhui Huang and Lukai Yang

Applied Economics, 2025, vol. 57, issue 24, 3219-3235

Abstract: The importance of corporate environmental governance and compliance in China is on a noticeable rise. Meanwhile, as the sole governing entity, the Chinese Communist Party’s involvement in the business landscape has sparked extensive interest. In this paper, we use the difference-in-difference framework and show that the mandatory requirement to establish a Communist Party branch within a firm after 2018 significantly reduces the likelihood of receiving environmental penalties. Furthermore, our findings indicate heterogeneous effects across firms as the results are more pronounced for firms that belong to heavily polluted industries, operate in regions with low air quality, or have CEOs and executives without green experience. Additionally, we provide evidence that green innovation can serve as a strategy for firms to enhance their environmental initiatives, consequently leading to a reduction in the penalties they incur. Finally, we demonstrate that firms with Party branches undergo a simultaneous decrease in government environmental subsidies and a reduction in both air and water pollutant emissions after 2018, a series of parallel outcomes attributable to enhanced governance brought about by the Party branch. Our study offers valuable insights into the considerable influence the government has on corporate decision-making and contributes to the emerging literature on environmental compliance.

Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1080/00036846.2024.2336887

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