Does symbolic AI-related disclosure influence CEO promotion? Evidence from state-owned enterprises in China

Xin Wang, Tingting Zhao, Yue Sun and Dan Yang

Applied Economics, 2025, vol. 57, issue 55, 9245-9263

Abstract: This paper considers firms’ artificial intelligence (AI)-related discretionary disclosure to examine whether symbolic communications of AI influences a CEO’s chance of career advancement in Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs). We find a positive relationship between symbolic AI disclosure and the possibility of managers getting promoted. Our main finding is more salient when a firm’s achievement of policy goals is more crucial, its financial performance is relatively poor, and a manager has more urgent promotion needs. Results imply that CEOs engage in impression management via managerial discretionary disclosure to strengthen organizational legitimacy and build a favourable impression, which may increase their probability of getting promoted.

Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1080/00036846.2024.2412257

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