No need for governance? The impact of corporate governance on valuation, performance and survival of German banks during the 1870s

Carsten Burhop

Business History, 2009, vol. 51, issue 4, 569-601

Abstract: We describe the legal rules underlying corporate governance of banks in Germany during the 1870s as well as the rules of governance fixed in corporate charters collected from a sample of 202 charters for the year 1872. Governance standards were - on average - below the legal default. In particular, voting rights as well as monitoring rights of shareholders were restricted. Most governance provisions did not affect the level of Tobin's Q in 1872, the change of the market-to-book ratio during 1873, and the probability of firm survival until 1880. Yet large banks having adopted a 'one share-one vote' provision and large banks having a governmental concession had a higher Tobin's Q, whereas the reverse holds for small banks. Moreover, the probability of firm survival was larger if small shareholders had voting rights or if shareholders could elect the supervisory board.

Keywords: financial history; Germany pre-1913; corporate governance; law and finance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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DOI: 10.1080/00076790903006463

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