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Introducing the inverted Icarus paradox in business history – Evidence from David and Goliath in the Swedish telecommunications industry 1981–1990

Klas Eriksson, Erik Lakomaa, Rasmus Nykvist and Christian Sandström

Business History, 2025, vol. 67, issue 2, 551-576

Abstract: Previous research in business and management history has identified the Icarus paradox, which describes how organisations may fall due to overconfidence and hubris. We build upon previous research on paradoxes in business history and introduce the notion of an inverted Icarus paradox. Using rich archival sources coded in a relational database, we show how an entrant firm, Comvik, outmanoeuvred an established government monopoly in the non-market domain from 1980 to 1990, despite inferior resources and a weak market position. The government monopoly Televerket faced an inverted Icarus paradox; it could not leverage its strengths and political connections as they were stuck in a David versus Goliath narrative where public opinion was more sympathetic to the entrant firm Comvik.

Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1080/00076791.2023.2292134

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