State responses to reputational concerns: the case of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative in Kazakhstan

Saipira Furstenberg

Central Asian Survey, 2018, vol. 37, issue 2, 286-304

Abstract: This article examines how reputational concerns drove the adoption of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) in Kazakhstan. The article argues that Kazakhstan's decision to join EITI was largely driven by the government’s intention to use EITI as a rational governance tool to manipulate its political agenda to protect the regime’s legitimacy. However, norm adherence does not reflect effective compliance. The findings of EITI in Kazakhstan show that the adoption of EITI standardized requirements followed a specific internal logic that disconnects from the initiative’s initial purpose. The case of Kazakhstan further illustrates the limitations of external remedies to the ‘resource curse’ and emphasises the significance of vertical accountability in political regimes. The article urges scholars and policy advisers to further investigate how global governance arrangements are implemented at domestic levels, particularly in autocratic regimes.

Date: 2018
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DOI: 10.1080/02634937.2018.1428789

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