The “motivated bias” dilemma in warfare and intelligence

Matthew H. Wahlert

Defense & Security Analysis, 2012, vol. 28, issue 3, 247-259

Abstract: The goal of this article is to challenge the assumption of rationality in the behavior of decision-making units involved in security, defense, intelligence and warfare and to consider the influence of “motivated bias” in such instances. A review of motivational literature within international politics and a discussion of literature applying “motivated biases” to warfare and strategic surprise will offer an alternative view of the primacy of rationality in such decisions.

Date: 2012
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DOI: 10.1080/14751798.2012.708596

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