Learning in counterinsurgency: what do we really know?

James Hasik

Defense & Security Analysis, 2013, vol. 29, issue 3, 203-217

Abstract: Since the publication in 2002 of John Nagl's Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife , organizational learning has been widely presumed an important ingredient for success in counterinsurgency. But sampling the literature from before and after this time shows remarkably little analytical treatment of the issue of learning and even confusion over what it may mean. This article considers the theories, hypotheses, research strategies, threats to validity, methods of measurement, treatments of time, and general lack of statistical analysis in the work to date and recommends a course for future research.

Date: 2013
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DOI: 10.1080/14751798.2013.820964

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