Making long-range planning work: the case of the US Army's 30-year strategic modernization plan

Hassan M. Kamara

Defense & Security Analysis, 2015, vol. 31, issue 3, 260-269

Abstract: The extensive timespan of evolving assumptions about future adversaries, US military engagements, and technology inherent in the US Army's 30-year modernization strategy can overwhelm the management capacity of planners, and misdirect acquisition investments. Some military scholars have argued that long-range planning is futile due to the complexities of the global security environment. So how can the US Army manage the evolving assumptions inherent in its 30-year modernization strategy to ensure it remains a superior global force? This study will answer the above question by arguing that the US Army's 30-year modernization strategy, while emulative of a similar modernization approach in the threat-based planning environment of the Cold War, is viable if supported by a method and a tool that manage investments and planning assumptions.

Date: 2015
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DOI: 10.1080/14751798.2015.1056936

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