U.S. Presidents’ use of drone warfare

Paul Lushenko

Defense & Security Analysis, 2022, vol. 38, issue 1, 31-52

Abstract: Scholars often reduce America's use of drones to a bureaucratic process. While this enables them to recognise shifts in America's use of strikes since 2002, they cannot adequately explain such change over time. Rather, I argue that America's use of strikes is a function of presidents' decisions. Presidents adopt strategic and legal-normative cognitive frames that shape their decisions to use strikes. I use this typology to study crucial and pathway cases during the Obama and Trump administrations. I show that presidents' decisions to use drones are made to achieve state and social goals. The balance between these aims is informed by, and constitutive of, presidents' strategic and legal-normative frames. Understanding America's use of drones as a leader-driven practice suggests that the legitimacy of strikes may relate more to their impact on the relationship between norms and interests, and not the military or political nature of targets, as some ethicists claim.

Date: 2022
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DOI: 10.1080/14751798.2022.2031708

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