Department of defense contracting out and its negative impact on U.S. military effectiveness

Thomas C. Bruneau

Defense & Security Analysis, 2025, vol. 41, issue 3, 373-391

Abstract: The United States is engaged in great power competition with China and its allies. The Department of Defense contracts out for upwards of 60% of its annual budget. The acquisition of technology with military application depends heavily on a cumbersome acquisition system. While there is some evidence of innovation, due to opaqueness of the acquisition process it is impossible for researchers to know for certain. In lieu of concrete evidence, the article focuses on the incentives of contracting professionals to utilize innovative acquisition authorities to facilitate innovation. This article argues that incentives for acquisition professionals can be built into the system similar to those of the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 for military officers.

Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1080/14751798.2025.2458994

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