Deterrence by demography? Southeast Asian migrant workers and the incentives for a Chinese blockade of Taiwan

Brad Williams

Defense & Security Analysis, 2025, vol. 41, issue 3, 525-543

Abstract: This article adopts a novel “narrow yet broad” conceptualisation of deterrence and applies it to the Taiwan issue. Deploying a framework that draws on an expanded understanding of deterrence that incorporates non-military elements, it introduces the concept of demographic deterrence to investigate the type of military measures China will be encouraged to adopt once it decides to use force to take control of Taiwan. Demographic deterrence in the Taiwan Strait is based on the various costs of foreign civilian casualties, especially Southeast Asian migrant workers. This article posits that this demographic factor creates strong disincentives for China to launch a deadly and destructive full-scale invasion of Taiwan. Reinforced by certain inherent operational advantages, China will instead be incentivised to begin military options to annex Taiwan by blockading the renegade province.

Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1080/14751798.2025.2512638

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