A no-displacement option? Rights, risks and negotiated settlement in development displacement

Susanna Price

Development in Practice, 2015, vol. 25, issue 5, 673-685

Abstract: “Voluntary” land transfer agreements, negotiated directly between “willing buyers and willing sellers”, present a seemingly empowering alternative to the use of legal instruments for land acquisition or transfer which entail forced displacement. Yet asymmetrical bargaining power between the negotiating parties can undermine the fairness of negotiated outcomes and the right of the sellers to a “no-displacement” option. Viewed against a complex background of bourgeoning land transfers in multiple sites, this article examines rights-based and risks-based approaches to negotiated settlements, concluding that measures to address asymmetries in bargaining power must look beyond enhanced negotiation procedures to address underlying social and political dimensions.

Date: 2015
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DOI: 10.1080/09614524.2015.1051514

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