(Dis-)Owning the Corporation: Three Models of Employee-Shareholder Activism

Natascha van der Zwan

New Political Economy, 2013, vol. 18, issue 1, 89-111

Abstract: This article focuses on the experimentation with shareholder activism by employee representatives in several large German corporations. I argue that these experiments are a manifestation of a new politics of solidarity that has emerged in the wake of the financialisation process in Germany. What unites the employee-shareholder activists is a strong rejection of short-term shareholder value maximisation, particularly as it affects the corporation's employees. To this end, they have created of a new form of interest organisation, the so-called employee shareholder associations ( Vereine der Belegschaftsaktion�re or ESAs) that have institutionalised local practices of employee-shareholder activism within German corporations. In this article, I will take a closer look at three ESAs and their activities, each representing a different type of employee-shareholder activism: a 'front door strategy' at Deutsche Telekom, a 'back door strategy' at Siemens, and 'peeking through the window' at TUI. This article will demonstrate that shareholder activism by local employee representatives offers an innovative variation on the typical conflict lines within the corporation identified by scholars of corporate governance.

Date: 2013
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DOI: 10.1080/13563467.2012.658767

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