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The International Politics of Reactive Currency Statecraft: Japan’s Reaction to the Rise of the Chinese Renminbi

Hyoung-kyu Chey

New Political Economy, 2019, vol. 24, issue 4, 510-529

Abstract: This study analyses how a state’s reactive currency statecraft – its strategic reaction to an international currency issued by a foreign state – is shaped, by devoting special attention to its broad foreign policy stance towards the state issuing that international currency, with a main empirical focus on the Japanese case with regard to the Chinese renminbi. This research argues that a state uses its policy related to a foreign international currency as a diplomatic means of managing its political relationship with the state issuing that currency, while also showing that in general most market actors are not greatly interested in their governments’ policies regarding foreign international currencies, especially those that are newly internationalising ones. This study finds as well that the conventional notion of ‘competition’ between international currencies does not necessarily affect a state’s reactive currency statecraft, even if its own currency is a major international one. All of this suggests that the inter-state politics between the state issuing an international currency and foreign states does have a crucial impact on the currency’s international use, especially during its early stages of internationalisation. It also implies that a state’s reactive currency statecraft can be fluid, depending upon the directions of its foreign policy.

Date: 2019
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DOI: 10.1080/13563467.2018.1461820

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