Producing Airpower: The Rise and Fall of Neo-Liberalism’s Defence Agenda

Marc R. DeVore

New Political Economy, 2019, vol. 24, issue 6, 873-891

Abstract: Few policy issues are more challenging than complex weaponry’s procurement and employment. Technology drives weapon costs upwards faster than economies are growing and militaries struggle to maintain increasingly sophisticated arms. Certain governments have adopted a reform agenda rooted in neo-liberal economic theory to address these challenges. Two broad policies – enhancing inter-firm competition for contracts and outsourcing activities to the private sector – emerged as central to this reform agenda. Although rarely presented as such, these reforms present a significant intellectual challenge to the hitherto predominant statist model for military power’s provision. Surprisingly, in light of neo-liberal policies’ adoption by militarily active states, no study has systematically examined these reforms’ content and impact. My article fills this lacuna by examining the state – the United Kingdom – that most consistently enacted neo-liberal defence reforms. To preview the conclusion, neo-liberal reforms initially generated small initial efficiencies, but then produced significant adverse consequences when pursued beyond a certain minimal level. Britain’s competition policy, for example, ultimately incentivized firms to consolidate into monopolies, which narrowed the scope for future competition and prevented the state from upholding fixed price contracts. Outsourcing, likewise, proved detrimental once policymakers sought to extend its scope beyond a limited range of simple services.

Date: 2019
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DOI: 10.1080/13563467.2018.1562431

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