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The BRICs and International Tax Governance: The Case of Automatic Exchange of Information

Dries Lesage, Wouter Lips and Mattias Vermeiren

New Political Economy, 2020, vol. 25, issue 5, 715-733

Abstract: This article investigates the BRICs’ involvement in the adoption of Automatic Exchange of Information (AEoI) by the G20 and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) as a major breakthrough in the global fight against tax evasion. Our main questions concern the BRICs’ willingness to accept AEoI, and their agreement to the Western-dominated OECD as its institutional forum. First, we examine the domestic drivers for BRICs’ participation, as their statist model of capitalism reveals strong disincentives to join this regime and the fact that the budgetary consequences of the global financial crisis were less severe than in Western states. We argue that their agreement on AEoI results more from their persistent balance-of-payments vulnerability to illicit capital than from fiscal weakness, while also discussing the possibilities for mock compliance. Second, we review the role of the non-reciprocal US foreign account tax compliance act (FATCA) in shaping the BRICs’ preference for a multilateral AEoI-regime centred around the OECD’s Common Reporting Standard (CRS). Last, we show that the BRICs’ acceptance of the OECD resulted from pragmatic interests and receiving ownership over the process, together with the absence of coercive mechanisms within the CRS-regime that could fundamentally undermine their sovereignty in this domain.

Date: 2020
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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DOI: 10.1080/13563467.2019.1584168

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