The public interest requirement in quiet business politics and noisy business politics – evidence from Australia

Stephen Bell

New Political Economy, 2025, vol. 30, issue 4, 481-493

Abstract: Using interview material from senior government relations executives in large firms in Australia and other sources, this paper argues for the need to bring the ‘public back in’ to improve our understanding of business government relations in terms of business influence and power. It argues that the role of the public and policy-relevant notions of the public interest can often play a central role here. This is important in ‘noisy’ business politics where voters and the public can be decisive in either supporting or constraining business. Moreover, even in ‘quiet’ business politics away from the immediate public gaze, and contrary to existing theory, the paper argues that business must be attentive to public interest agendas if its quiet lobbying is to appeal to government electoral incentives and be successful. Hence, in both arenas business has strong incentives to be attentive to what might be called the ‘public interest requirement’ or the PIR.

Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1080/13563467.2024.2446191

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