The Dilemmas of Temporary Protection ‐ the Norwegian Experience

Jan-Paul Brekke

Policy Studies, 2001, vol. 22, issue 1, 5-18

Abstract: Temporary protection for refugees was a recurring topic on the European agenda during the 1990s. The instrument was first implemented in most Western European states following the mass outflow from Bosnia Herzegovina during 1992-93. In this article the experiences drawn from the use of temporary protection for Bosnian refugees in Norway are discussed. What were the main challenges that the government faced in the implementation of temporary protection, and what dilemmas emerged? Were these specific to the Bosnian situation and the Norwegian version of temporary protection, or were weaknesses exposed that are inherent in the temporary model itself? The article is based on research done as part of a larger Nordic study, where the development of the temporary instrument and its effects on the refugees was studied from 1995 to 1998. Four central dilemmas that the government encountered under the formulation and implementation of the temporary instrument are identified and discussed. This is followed by an assessment of the advantages and disadvantages of the temporary reception model. It is focused on a number of processes that start at the time of the refugee's arrival. Together these contributed to making it difficult for the Norwegian government to maintain the premise of return, which was the key element in the temporary policy. It is argued that the model carries possibilities for political costs. The potential use of coercion, which is a key component of the model, is prone to spark controversy. In Norway, the fading support for this restrictive side of the model led to permanent statutes for the refugees. Time is put forward as the main challenge for governments that implement the temporary regime. In the concluding remarks, several general characteristics of the temporary model are highlighted. It has a generous side - it allows for larger groups to be received - as well as a restrictive side. Since the soft side appears first in time, the temporary policy has a seductive character. The instrument is also characterized by being time fragile. As time passes it becomes increasingly difficult for the authorities to uphold the premise of return. If the support for the policy fades during the temporary period, one risks premature termination. The cost of the model - the refugee's uncertain situation - will then fail to serve a higher purpose.

Date: 2001
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DOI: 10.1080/01442870120047695

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