ENFORCING A NATIONAL MINIMUM WAGE

Richard Croucher and Geoff White

Policy Studies, 2007, vol. 28, issue 2, 145-161

Abstract: This article reports on indicative research examining the effectiveness of the British government's National Minimum Wage enforcement, a subject not previously investigated. The law, it has been argued, largely provides the tools needed for effective enforcement. Employer compliance levels as measurable from government statistics are, however, unclear and there are therefore no solid grounds for assuming that the current balance between employer ‘self regulation’ and enforcement is appropriate. The research reveals significant problems with the enforcement process; only a minority of workers in our sample received their legal rights without detriment. For many workers, the process entailed significant costs. The current system of ‘light touch’ self-regulation, may not be suitable where vulnerable workers without the support of any collective representation, are concerned. Recommendations for improvements in the enforcement process are made but we also note the relevance of the national political context for ensuring that the regulatory body has sufficient support to operate effectively.

Date: 2007
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DOI: 10.1080/01442870701309080

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