NEGOTIATING AN EXCEPTION

Adrian Kay, Badrul Kassim, David Pickernell and David Brooksbank

Policy Studies, 2007, vol. 28, issue 2, 175-191

Abstract: What happens to a regulatory regime when the company that it has been designed to regulate radically changes form? We examine the case of Glas Cymru (GC), which was set up in 2001 and is unique within the England and Wales water industry in being entirely debt financed and operated on a not-for-profit basis. The article argues that the Office for Water Services (Ofwat) has been able to accommodate GC successfully as a unique case within an extant regulatory regime designed for shareholder controlled, for-profit water companies. It has been able to do so because of the confluence of financial and political factors: a low purchase price for GC at the end of 2000 and all-party support for the GC model in the National Assembly for Wales.

Date: 2007
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/01442870701312100 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:cposxx:v:28:y:2007:i:2:p:175-191

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/cpos20

DOI: 10.1080/01442870701312100

Access Statistics for this article

Policy Studies is currently edited by Toby James

More articles in Policy Studies from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().