Shock and awe: the effects of disinformation in military confrontation

Matthew T. Clements

Policy Studies, 2014, vol. 35, issue 3, 211-220

Abstract: This paper analyzes the effects of disinformation in a military conflict. If one army distorts its opponents' perception of its ability, this will create a greater propensity for soldiers on the opposing side to surrender. The sender of disinformation will thus have a greater probability of victory. However, disinformation may also lengthen the battle and increase the total number of casualties. This depends not only on the degree of disinformation but also on whether and to what extent the sender of disinformation is superior to the receiver.

Date: 2014
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DOI: 10.1080/01442872.2014.886679

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