Are inequalities in representation lower under compulsory voting?

Eric Guntermann, Ruth Dassonneville and Peter Miller

Policy Studies, 2020, vol. 41, issue 2-3, 151-171

Abstract: In recent years, there has been considerable scholarly interest in inequalities in representation between rich and poor citizens. Just over 20 years ago, Lijphart argued that compulsory voting could reduce such inequalities by boosting the turnout of the poor. We measure the efficacy of Lijphart’s proposal with regard to three measures of representation; (1) ideological congruence, (2) an indicator of whether a citizen’s preferred party enters government and (3) an indicator of how much citizens like governing parties compared to opposition parties. We find that the extent to which the rich are better represented than the poor varies strongly across countries. We also find that the income gap in representation is smaller in the compulsory voting countries in our sample. However, turnout is not a significant predictor of inequalities in representation.

Date: 2020
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DOI: 10.1080/01442872.2019.1694649

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